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THE FUTURE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN CONTEXT: A
RESPONSE TO LEDEWITZ
BY CHRISTOPHER C. LUND*
Five days before we met in Pittsburgh last year, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals decided Kentucky Office of Homeland Security v. Christerson.1
Perhaps some in Kentucky noticed the decision, but it did not receive much
widespread attention. Following the September 11th attacks, Kentucky
created its own Department of Homeland Security. The implementing leg-
islation included a number of factual findings-one of them being that
"[t]he safety and security of the Commonwealth cannot be achieved apart
from reliance upon Almighty God.. . For as was written long ago: 'Except
the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain.' 2 Kentucky also
required its Department of Homeland Security to publicize this finding in
its training materials and on a commemorative plaque.3 As you might ex-
pect, this drew complaints and eventually a lawsuit.
If you are familiar with the Establishment Clause, you will see the
constitutional issue: Kentucky's actions here seem to violate the well-
known constitutional rule that the government cannot endorse or promote
religion. But if you know how the Establishment Clause really works, you
will not be terribly surprised to learn that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
upheld this statute.
And knowing the outcome, you can probably now guess the general
gist of the court's opinion. The court might apply the Lemon test and con-
clude that the statute has a secular purpose and effect. 4 The court might
apply the endorsement test and say that there is no endorsement of reli-
gion. 5 The court might apply several tests at once and declare them all sat-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I am pleased to have been at
the Duquesne University School of Law last fall for its symposium, "The Future of the Establishment
Clause in Context." I am particularly grateful to Bruce Ledewitz, its organizer. It is hard to find anyone
as charitable, as thoughtful, and as kind as Bruce is. I am also grateful to Duquesne's Associate Dean,
Jane Moriarty, for her gracious hospitality and helpful advice. For their valuable comments on this
piece, I thank Chad Flanders and Kerry Kornblatt.
1. 2011 WL 5105253 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 28,2011).
2. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39A.285(3) (West 2002) (quoting Psalms 127:1).
3. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39G.010(2)(a) (West 2006).
4. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (articulating the Lemon test).
5. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (articulating the endorse-
ment test).
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isfied. But formal tests aside, the essence of the court's decision will be the
same: although the statute sounds religious, it really isn't-or, at least, it
isn't exclusively or predominantly religious. 6 The statute might refer to
God, but those references can be interpreted in a secular fashion. The Ken-
tucky legislature may have used religious language, but context suggests
that it did not really mean to take sides in a theological dispute.
Yet in Christerson, this logic hit a bump in the road. Understanding
how this game is played, the Kentucky legislature wrote in to the court to
make one thing crystal clear: they had meant to take sides in a theological
dispute. Thirty-five out of the thirty-eight state senators and ninety-six out
of the one-hundred state representatives-95 percent of Kentucky's legisla-
ture-joined in two amicus briefs defending the statute. They did not de-
fend it as religiously neutral; they instead attacked the principle of religious
neutrality. The subtext was this. We believe in God. We intended these
religious references seriously. Uphold them on that ground. Don't you dare
call them secular. Don't you dare imply that they are meaningless.7
So what happened? Well, utterly unmoved by all this, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals did what it was going to do. It upheld the statute.8 It said
that the statute was mostly secular.9 It implied that the religious references
were indeed meaningless.' 0 You know how it goes.
Douglas Laycock calls this "the lie"-it is simply a lie, he says, for
courts to label this kind of thing as secular in order to uphold it but still
maintain lip service to the constitutional principle of religious neutrality."
And one sees the lie at work quite vividly in Christerson. Lawyers some-
times speak of two different types of meaning-the subjective and the ob-
6. Cf Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring, and providing the
fifth vote) (upholding the government's display of the Ten Commandments, on the grounds that the
display "communicates not simply a religious message, but a secular message as well" and that the
"nonreligious aspects of the tablets' message ... predominate").
7. Though they had much in common, the two briefs advanced somewhat different legal argu-
ments. One brief argued for a complete overhaul of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Brief of
Amicus Curiae Thirty-Five Kentucky State Senators, Ky. Office of Homeland Sec. v. Christerson, 2011
WL 5105253 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2011) (08-CI-1950). The other argued within governing Supreme
Court precedents. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Ninety-Six Kentucky State Representatives, Ky. Office
of Homeland Sec. v. Christerson, 2011 WL 5105253 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2011) (08-CI-1950).
8. Christerson, 2011 WL 5105253, at *3, *4.
9. Id. at *4 ("The legislation complained of here does not seek to advance religion, nor does it
have the effect of advancing religion, but instead seeks to recognize the historical reliance on God for
protection.").
10. Id. at *4 ("The legislation merely pays lip service to a commonly held belief in the puissance
of God.").
11. See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge ofAllegiance, and Religious Liber-
ty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REv. 155, 225 (2004); Douglas
Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing Conceptions and Historic Changes, 13
IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEG. STUDIEs 503, 529 (2006).
[Vol 87:3768
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN CONTEXT
jective. Here they converged. On the subjective level, the Kentucky legisla-
ture intended a religious message; its amici briefs made that clear. On the
objective level, the text of the statute-"[lt]he safety and security of the
Commonwealth cannot be achieved apart from reliance upon Almighty
God"-plainly suggests the existence of God. No other interpretation is
possible, let alone plausible. God cannot protect Kentucky unless God ex-
ists. But the statute actually makes a much stronger claim. Kentucky cannot
be safe unless its citizens place their trust in God. Nonbelievers are not
merely wrong; they are wrong in a way that endangers their fellow citizens.
Atheists are a threat to the security of the state.
Faced with all this, the Kentucky Court of Appeals chose to stick with
the lie. Of course, the lie is not a lie in the strict sense. Legal meanings do
not have to match idiomatic meanings. And that is what the lie boils down
to, in the end. We now have things that are factually religious but legally
nonreligious-government actions that we deem nonreligious as a matter of
law, no matter how religious they might be as a matter of fact. But this
legal fiction is just a fiction, and cases like Christerson reveal how the fig
leaf is always at risk of being stripped away.
Of course, no one blames either the Christerson court or the parties to
the case. The Supreme Court started us down this path long ago. The Court
accepted the creche in Lynch as having historical value.12 It approved of the
Christmas tree and menorah in Allegheny County as cultural rather than
religious. 13 It upheld the Ten Commandments in Van Orden as a combina-
tion of the moral, cultural, and historical.14 Those on the left see this as the
lie in action, and want these things struck down. Those on the right agree
that this is a lie, but want them upheld. There are few people that actually
believe the lie.
Bruce Ledewitz does not believe the lie exactly. But he would proba-
bly not call it a lie. A nonbeliever himself, Ledewitz encourages his fellow
nonbelievers to be more accepting of government-sponsored religion. It is
not that atheists and agnostics need to put up with religious language they
find offensive. Rather there is no reason for them to be offended at all.
Atheism is not incompatible with religious language and religious symbols.
12. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984) (arguing that Christmas is a "significant
historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World" and that "[tihe creche in the display
depicts the historical origins of this traditional event").
13. See County of Allegheny v ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 619 (1989) (claiming that the display was
"not an endorsement of religious faith but simply a recognition of cultural diversity").
14. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring, and providing the
fifth vote) (calling "the religious aspect of the tablets' message [simply] part of what is a broader moral
and historical message reflective of a cultural heritage").
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"[T]he symbol 'God' has many meanings," Ledewitz says, "some of which
have nothing to do with a supernatural creator of the universe."1 5 Were
nonbelievers to "reinterpret" religious language and imagery so as to be
consistent with their own nonreligious worldviews, then everyone would
win. Religious people would get governmental approval of their prayers
and religious symbols. Atheists would not feel excluded. All the litigation
could end. And our society would enjoy increased religious understanding
and a greater sense of connection among our citizenry.
Ledewitz will not tolerate all governmental uses of religious language
and imagery. There has to be a "plausible" nonreligious meaning-a plau-
sible case that a nonreligious person could interpret the government's ac-
tion in some secular fashion.16 But apart from that, religious imagery is
acceptable, no matter the government's intentions and whatever the ordi-
nary religious connotations of the words used.
I have mixed feelings about Ledewitz's proposal. I suppose my big-
gest hesitation is that it seems unlikely to succeed. Ledewitz wants to
change the social meaning of religious language and religious symbols in a
way that I do not think possible. Atheists will not embrace God, even as a
concept. The rejection of God-the rejection of theism-is what it literally
means to be an atheist. Most atheists will not accept the word "God" as a
placeholder for their deepest values, just as most Jews will not accept Jews
for Jesus as a mere reinterpretation of their faith.
And if Ledewitz's proposal somehow began to work-if atheists be-
gan to embrace the word God as a secular concept-that would upset the
other side. Those who want government support for religion want their
government to reject atheism. If atheists begin to co-opt the word God, then
these religious believers will insist on more particularized religious en-
dorsements that say more and more about God. Intense atheists and intense
religious believers can work together on a lot of issues, but asking them to
agree on religious matters seems silly to me. If we were all really able to
15. Bruce Ledewitz, Toward a Meaning-Full Establishment Clause Neutrality, 87 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 725, 751 (2012); see also BRUCE LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN
SECULARISM 132 (2011) [hereinafter LEDEWITZ, CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN
SECULARISM] ("Even for a nonbeliever, a word like 'God' can serve as a stand-in for the concept of the
Absolute.").
16. Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 756 ("The plausibility test is the key to my proposal about the
permissible use of religious imagery."); id. at 754 ("the government's proffered secular justification is
plausible, this kind of subjective untruthfulness is irrelevant to either law or politics. The meaning of
government expression in the public square is social, not subjective."); see also LEDEWITZ, CHURCH,
STATE, AND THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN SECULARISM, supra note 15, at 134-35 (elaborating on the
plausibility standard).
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agree on religious matters, we would not need to talk about religious tolera-
tion in the first place.
My second concern is that Ledewitz's approach seems somewhat un-
defined. His approach depends upon his views of social meaning. But, as I
explained above, his views on that are atypical. Ledewitz thinks that the
word "God" can be made consistent with atheism; I think very few atheists
would agree with that. Ledewitz says that government-sponsored religion
should be permissible as long as there is a "plausible" nonreligious mean-
ing.17 But because I have little idea how Ledewitz gets nonreligious mean-
ing out of religious symbols and words, I have little idea when Ledewitz
would find such a thing plausible. Ledewitz accepts government-sponsored
prayer, at least nondenominational prayer, arguing that atheists can reinter-
pret the word "God." That reinterpretation is plausible to him. But he re-
jects government-sponsored Christmas displays-or at least nativity
scenes. Apparently no such reinterpretation is plausible there.18 Maybe
Ledewitz has this right. Or maybe he has it backwards. I know of atheists
who celebrate Christmas-who have Christmas trees, put up Christmas
lights, and exchange Christmas gifts. I know of no atheists who pray to
God.
Having said all this, I should make clear that I think very much of
Ledewitz's work. He admirably tries to bridge the cultural gap between
atheists and religious believers. As an atheist, he speaks directly to his own
side, trying to help his fellow nonbelievers find some common ground with
those on the other side. That is very important work, even if it has nothing
to do with law. In fact, having nearly finished this review, I now realize
that Ledewitz is probably more interested in increasing religious under-
standing than in coming up with workable Establishment Clause doctrine.
Though I agree with that goal, I do not think this is the way to go
about it. The conflict between intense believers and intense nonbelievers
will not go away. Both sides see themselves as too different; both sides
define themselves by reference to the other. And rather than trying to pre-
vent that conflict, or deny that there is a conflict, I think the way forward is
to set terms for that conflict-to ensure that it stays nonviolent, to ensure
that neither side uses the organs of government to repress the other, to en-
sure that both sides get to choose the lives they want as much as possible.
The best approach, I think, is for the government to stay out of the conflict
as much as possible. That is why I believe in religious neutrality.
17. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
18. Ledewitz, supra note 15, at 749 (agreeing with the Court's conclusion in Allegheny County
that the crche there violated the Establishment Clause).
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Ledewitz worries that a strict kind of religious neutrality will lead to
an impoverished state of public discourse. He worries that neutrality, ap-
plied to the limits of its logic, will bar the government from taking posi-
tions on moral issues. 19 He fears that it may further corrode public
discourse-that it will work to inhibit "[c]ommunal expression in a demo-
cratic community." 20
I do not share these fears, because I do not think this is where religious
neutrality leads. The government can take positions on moral issues. It can
teach that racial discrimination is wrong. It can say that peoples' bad ac-
tions will come back around to them.21 It can generally make any sort of
moral claim, subject only to the familiar political reality that our society
disagrees deeply on some issues of right and wrong. The one thing-the
only thing, in this context-that the Establishment Clause bars is the gov-
ernment taking religious positions.
I admit there is some potential for awkwardness here. A student asks
why racial discrimination is wrong. The teacher says that it violates human
equality and human dignity. The student might persist-where do human
equality and human dignity come from? At that point, the teacher has to
stay agnostic-"Some people believe that they come from God; others
believe that human equality and human dignity are simply important hu-
man values." Few high school students will be perceptive enough to ask
that sort of question, but the constitutional concerns there can be handled in
any event.
As for Ledewitz's concern about communal expression and the sense
of community that it fosters, I see his worry as misplaced. The government
can (and does) act to foster a sense of community. This sense of communi-
ty comes from a variety of things, from parades to sporting events, from
inspiring public speeches to sobering public eulogies. Religion too has an
important role to play, through churches and other voluntary religious
groups. But that role should not be played by the state. Of course, that does
require the sacrifice of one particular liberty: people will not be able to get
the state to adopt their religious views. They might feel that loss keenly.
But that is precisely the loss that the Establishment Clause imposes, in
exchange for the confidence that the religious tables will never be turned
on them later.
19. Id. at 117-19.
20. Id. at 136.
21. Id. at 131 (discussing this point).
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